On Thursday, August 8, 1974, millions gathered around their television sets to watch history. Pictured: President Richard Nixon and Chief Justice Warren Burger. Photo Credit: Richard Nixon Foundation.
On July 8, 1974, United States v Nixon reached the Supreme Court after its annual session. Nixon’s attorneys had argued that the president should enjoy executive privilege regarding conversations held in the executive offices of the US government. President Richard Nixon said that the conversations recorded could compromise national security. For the seven men indicted as part of the Watergate investigation, gaining access to these tapes could clear them of wrongdoing or put the onus on the president.
“On July 24, 1974, a unanimous Court (with Justice Rehnquist not taking part due to a prior role in the Nixon administration) ruled against the President. Chief Justice Warren Burger said that the President didn’t have an absolute, unqualified privilege to withhold information.” (National Constitution Center, Looking Back: The Supreme Court Decision that Ended Nixon’s Presidency).
Justifying the ruling in a fulsome statement, Burger said, “We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”
With the ruling announced, Nixon had a couple of options. He could hand over the tapes and continue his efforts to hold on to office. Or he could resign.
As we have recently seen with President Joe Biden, under different conditions, once the lot is cast, even a president can only delay the inevitable, push back so much, or try to turn the tide. Nixon’s instincts were to fight. He had sought the job of president for most of the previous 30 years and after winning a resounding victory in 1972 had no interest in handing over the reins to his recently appointed vice-president, Gerald Ford. (In a separate case of interest not connected to Watergate, Nixon’s first vice-president, Spiro Agnew had resigned in 1973 for income tax evasion).
For a short while the president hoped he could strong-arm his friends on Capitol Hill to stick by his side. The Judiciary Committee was busy drawing up three articles of impeachment as the Court prepared its ruling. On July 27, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee released its articles of impeachment against Nixon. The first article against Nixon read in part, “…in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice…”
In the second article, the Committee said Nixon “has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws governing agencies of the executive branch and the purpose of these agencies.”
Thirdly, they wrote that Nixon “(had) failed without lawful cause or excuse to produce papers and things as directed by duly authorized subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on April 11, 1974, May 15, 1974, May 30, 1974, and June 24, 1974, and willfully disobeyed such subpoenas.” In effect, the Committee charged Nixon with obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress. Nixon’s options narrowed.
One advisor suggested that he defy the Supreme Court to protect the presidency, destroy the tapes, and then resign from office. Nixon may have considered this, but as John Osborne pointed out in The New Republic (August 24, 1974, “Inside the Last 17 Days of the Nixon White House”), Nixon knew that the tapes were ruinous. If he surrendered them to the Judiciary Committee, Impeachment would follow. While destroying the tapes meant the sure end of his presidency, he could continue if he could avoid conviction after being impeached.
As the president and his aides conferred, it became obvious that three tapes were of most concern. The tapes recorded conversations between Nixon and Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972. Of the 129 minutes, six revealed Nixon’s knowledge of the break-in and the subsequent cover-up. If the Committee got their hands on those tapes impeachment articles and hearings would move ahead in full force. Nixon knew his chances were slim, but still entertained hanging on for the fight. Regardless of what his close aides said about the tapes, the White House team appeared committed to weathering the storm. Ron Ziegler, Nixon’s Press Secretary, told the press after the first articles of impeachment came out of committee on July 27, “The President remains confident that the full House will recognize that there simply is not the evidence to support this or any other article of impeachment and will not vote to impeach. He is confident because he knows he has committed no impeachable offense.”
On July 28 the White House team returned to Washington and the transcripts of the tapes were presented to Nixon’s new Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, and Nixon attorney, John St. Clair, on July 31. They were stunned. Having seen the transcripts, the idea of preparing a defence for the three articles of impeachment seemed pointless. Instead, Nixon and his team headed to Camp David to prepare for one of two scenarios. Nixon would either resign or stay through the impeachment, face conviction and be turfed from office. His instincts were to fight it to the end, admitting some errors and miscalculations hoping he could harness enough support from his partisans to avoid the two-thirds conviction required in the Senate. On Tuesday, August 6, Haig instructed Nixon’s favourite speechwriter, Raymond Price, to compose a resignation address.
On Wednesday afternoon Haig organized a delegation of Republican senators and congressional members to visit Nixon, with party stalwart Barry Goldwater of Arizona as its head. They confirmed to Nixon how hopeless his situation in Congress looked. “Goldwater, along with House Republican Leader John Jacob Rhodes and Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott, entered the Oval Office around 5 p.m. The Arizona senator sat directly in front of Nixon’s desk, the others to the side. Goldwater told Nixon he had perhaps 16 to 18 Senate supporters left – too few to avoid ouster. Congressman Rhodes said House support was just as soft.” (Christian Science Monitor, Aug 7, 2014).
Nixon had probably already decided to resign. This confirmed his worst fears. Goldwater intimated he would probably vote to convict as well. On Thursday, August 8, 1974, millions gathered around their television sets to watch history. The 37th President reported to the country:
“From the discussions I have had with Congressional and other leaders, I have concluded that because of the Watergate matter I might not have the support of the Congress that I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties of this office in the way the interests of the Nation would require.
“I have never been a quitter. To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interest of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad.
“To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.
“Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.”
Next week I will examine the aftermath of Watergate to conclude this series.
Dave Redekop is a retired elementary resource teacher who now works part-time at the St. Catharines Courthouse as a Registrar. He has worked on political campaigns since high school and attended university in South Carolina for five years, where he earned a Master’s in American History with a specialization in Civil Rights. Dave loves reading biographies.