Stellantis standoff tests Ottawa’s old playbook
When Stellantis agreed in 2022 to retool its Brampton and Windsor plants for electric vehicles, Ottawa committed up to $529 million. The deal was part of a broader federal push, alongside the Windsor battery plant, to anchor the EV supply chain in Ontario. EV demand has since softened, not to mention the impact of the ongoing trade dispute, which is crippling Canada’s automotive sector.
Responding to the changes in the market, Stellantis paused its production of the Jeep Compass in its Brampton plant. Later, the company moved the line to Illinois, leaving more than 2,000 Canadian workers laid off and the plant idle.
Last week, Stellantis announced it would sell the plant to Roshel, a Brampton-based armoured vehicle maker. In response, Industry Minister Mélanie Joly served the company with a notice of default, giving it 30 days to correct its breaches or face a lawsuit. Stellantis has offered to return $24 million. Joly says the company is on the hook for hundreds of millions, arguing that Brampton is contractually tied to Windsor and the battery investment.
Later in the week, Joly and Ontario Economic Development Minister Vic Fedeli said the governments were preparing an “aggressive package” to persuade Stellantis to cancel the sale, drawing partly on a $2.5 billion federal-provincial auto fund. Threaten to sue, then offer more money. That sequence says a lot about how Ottawa works.
The politics complicate it further. It appears as though senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office and Joly’s office knew about the proposed sale for months and did not stand in its way. Prime Minister Mark Carney first called the deal a betrayal, then a partial solution. Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre wants every penny returned and Joly fired.
Brampton is not an isolated case. In 2008, Stephen Harper toured the Electro-Motive Diesel plant in London, Ont., to promote tax breaks that benefited the locomotive maker. Four years later, owner Caterpillar locked out workers who refused a deep pay cut and closed the plant. In 2009, Ottawa and Ontario put $13.7 billion into rescuing GM and Chrysler and lost roughly $3.5 billion. A decade later, GM ended car production in Oshawa. Quebec lost $270 million on Swedish battery maker Northvolt in 2025.
The pattern holds across governments of both parties. Ottawa pays up front for promised jobs, while the decisions that determine whether those jobs last are made in head offices abroad. When tariffs or demand change, the subsidy becomes a sunk cost for the company and a political problem for the government. Clawback clauses look stronger at signing than they do in court.
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None of this means Canada can stop competing for foreign investment. It brings capital and companies the country cannot always generate on its own, and every advanced economy is bidding for it. The question inside government is how much of its industrial policy should rest on winning that bid.
A second approach is taking shape. The Defence Industrial Strategy released in February sets out a Build, Partner, Buy framework. Ottawa builds in Canada first, partners with trusted allies when domestic capability falls short, and buys abroad only when neither works, with reinvestment conditions attached. Public procurement accounts for nearly15 per cent of Canada’s GDP. Directed deliberately, that spending makes government a customer rather than a grant-giver.
Roshel shows what that can look like. Its growth rests on Canadian and allied defence demand, and its decisions are made in Brampton. It has promised hiring priority to laid-off workers, though Unifor notes that priority is not a guarantee.
The tension is that Ottawa is running both playbooks at once. In defence, it talks about building domestic champions through procurement. In autos, it is still negotiating with a multinational over subsidies already paid, while offering more. How the government handles Brampton over the next 30 days will show which approach it actually trusts.